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“Our attitude towards pleading formalities will be largely determined by what we 
expect of the pleadings.” 
–Hon. Charles E. Clark1 
INTRODUCTION 
Twenty-five years ago, at a conference held at Northeastern University 
School of Law marking the fiftieth anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil 
 
† Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.  
1 Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 456 (1943). 
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Procedure, pleading was invoked more often as a model of the Rules’ 
commitment to merits adjudication than as a problem to be solved.2 Although 
participants adverted to an ongoing debate about whether more should be 
demanded of pleadings, they mostly worried about the effect of other 
procedural reforms on access to justice.3 After all, there were many recent 
reforms to debate: amendments to Rule 11, restrictions on class actions, the 
Supreme Court’s Rule 56 trilogy, limitations on discovery, and tightened 
standing requirements.4 But when it came to pleading, participants took as a 
given the liberal notice pleading regime established by Conley v. Gibson,5 
even as they recognized that some lower courts had experimented with non-
trans-substantive pleading regimes for particular categories of cases.6 
For the balance of the last quarter century, the conference participants’ 
overall optimism about the state of pleading would prove sensible. Thrice 
the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of notice pleading and the 
illegitimacy of attempts to alter the pleading standards outside of the 
rulemaking process.7 Most lower courts that had flirted with heightened 
pleading standards for specific categories of cases eventually beat a retreat, 
if not a hasty one.8 
Yet, with the announcement of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly9 and Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal,10 the Supreme Court changed what courts expect of notice pleading. 
Whether one calls it “the new summary judgment motion,”11 “new” or 
“heightened” pleading,12 or (as I will use throughout this paper) plausibility 
pleading, the burdens of pleading have changed. Many scholars have already 
 
2 See generally Symposium, The 50th Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1938–
1988, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1873, 1874 (1989). 
3 See Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers 
to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1902-03, 1906 (1989) (discussing developments in 
subject matter jurisdiction, fee-shifting, and standing doctrines). 
4 Id. at 1913-18 (discussing reforms). 
5 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
6 See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exor-
cism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2105-07 
(1989) (noting that, “in recent decades, lower federal courts appear to have entertained Rule 12 
motions with increasing frequency, especially in a few substantive classes of cases”); Weinstein, 
supra note 3, at 1914 (discussing pleading rules for “specialized kinds of cases”). 
7 See infra note 29. 
8 See infra note 22. 
9 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
10 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
11 Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and 
Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 28-34 (2010) (discussing similarities between 
plausibility pleading and summary judgment).  
12 See SCOTT DODSON, NEW PLEADING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: SLAMMING 
THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSE DOORS? 4-5 (2013) (adopting the term “New Pleading”). 
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written about the burden plausibility pleading imposes upon claimants.13 As 
most commentators have argued, the introduction of plausibility pleading is 
congruent with many other restrictions on courthouse access that have 
emerged over the past fifty years.14 In this Article, I do not focus on the 
pleading burden as it is received by and applied against claimants, nor do I 
make additional arguments that plausibility pleading limits access to the 
courthouse. Instead, I argue that the burden of plausibility pleading also 
falls on judges, and that judges are poorly situated to shoulder that burden—
especially when one considers how restrictions on courthouse access and 
other changes have reshaped the nature of litigation in the federal courts. 
To preview my argument briefly, plausibility pleading formally asks 
judges—for the first time since the advent of the Federal Rules—to engage 
in a merits-based analysis at the pleading stage based on their “judicial 
experience and common sense.”15 Judges are expected to engage in this 
inquiry with only the factual allegations in the complaint at their disposal. 
Putting aside the difficulty of conducting this analysis under the best of 
circumstances, our federal judges have extremely limited judicial experience 
to apply to merits-based decisions. The number of trials, the ultimate 
arbiter of merit, has fallen precipitously in the past fifty years.16 Trials have 
been replaced by settlements (the terms of which are often secret, even to 
the judge handling the case), alternative dispute resolution (with outcomes 
that judges may review only for arbitrariness, if they review them at all), 
and summary judgment (a poor substitute for trial).17 With these gaps in 
judicial experience, a judge is left to compensate with “common sense,” 
relying on heuristics that may interfere with accurate decisionmaking.18 
This argument is not made to denigrate federal judges but rather to 
identify the impoverished landscape of actual merits-based determinations 
upon which federal courts can draw to assess the plausibility of new claims. 
Moreover, the argument should be familiar to even casual readers of Twombly; 
 
13 See, e.g., Alexander A. Reinert, Pleading as Information-Forcing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 1, 1-2 (2012) (reviewing the breadth of literature on the topic). 
14 See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the 
Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 309-10 (2013) 
(introducing an analysis of pleading changes in the context of other procedural “stop signs” erected 
during the past twenty-five years); Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and 
for the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 105 (2008) (listing 
changes in pleading rules as one example of many changes that have made it harder for plaintiffs 
to access the courts). 
15 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 
16 See infra subsection II.A.1. 
17 See infra subsection II.A.2–II.A.5. 
18 See infra Section II.B. 
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there, the Court determined that judges were incapable of managing discovery 
given their limited knowledge and understanding of the cases before them.19 
Thus began the shift toward plausibility pleading. If one accepts Twombly’s 
reasoning, however, it is counterintuitive to ask courts to do more with less 
by requiring a merits-based determination at the pleading stage. 
The structure of this Article is straightforward. In Part I, I review the 
changes wrought by plausibility pleading. In Part II, I present the core of 
my argument: namely, that it is unrealistic to expect judges to shoulder the 
new burden of plausibility pleading given the structural and practical 
changes in the work of the federal judiciary over the past fifty years. I 
conclude the Article with remarks about the links between different procedural 
eras and their would-be reformers.  
I. FROM CONLEY TO IQBAL 
Iqbal20 and its predecessor, Twombly,21 introduced a change in federal 
pleading standards that had, until then, remained essentially static for 
decades.22 In 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure established a 
“notice pleading” system for federal courts via Rule 8(a)(2), abandoning 
 
19 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559-60 & n.6 (2007). 
20 556 U.S. 662. 
21 550 U.S. 544. 
22 The pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), first announced in 
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), had remained in place despite intermittent attempts to 
heighten pleading requirements for specific kinds of litigation. See, e.g., Christopher M. Fairman, 
The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 998-1011 (2003) (summarizing different 
categories of heightened pleading). By 2007, though, when Twombly was decided, only the 
Eleventh Circuit explicitly maintained a heightened pleading standard for a specific type of case, 
namely civil rights cases. See Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 996 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e must 
keep in mind the heightened pleading requirements for civil rights cases, especially those 
involving the defense of qualified immunity.”). By then, however, the Supreme Court had 
consistently rejected lower courts’ attempts to apply heightened pleading standards to particular 
kinds of cases. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511-14 (2002) (rejecting the Second 
Circuit’s application of a heightened pleading standard in employment discrimination cases); 
Leatherman v. Tarant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) 
(holding that federal courts may not apply more-stringent-than-usual pleading standards to civil 
rights cases alleging municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). In keeping with this message, 
nearly every circuit other than the Eleventh had recognized that the sufficiency of complaints 
should be assessed under a single standard, regardless of the substantive matter of the lawsuit. See 
Doe v. Cassel, 403 F.3d 986, 989 & n.3 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding that Swierkiewicz abrogated the 
Eighth Circuit’s heightened pleading standard for § 1983 suits and listing cases from the First, 
Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits that reached the same conclusion); 
Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001) (rejecting a heightened pleading standard in 
qualified immunity cases). 
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technical rules applied in both common law and code pleading jurisdictions.23 
In 1957, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized the notice pleading system 
in Conley v. Gibson.24 Under this regime, complaints satisfied Rule 8(a)(2) 
without providing detailed facts, so long as they provided adequate notice to 
the defendant of the nature of the suit.25 In addition, a motion to dismiss 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) would not be granted “unless it appear[ed] 
beyond doubt that the plaintiff c[ould] prove no set of facts in support of 
his claim which would entitle him to relief.”26 Rule 12(b)(6) was to be 
invoked in those rare cases in which no viable legal theory supported the 
plaintiff ’s claim.27 
Notice pleading remained the standard, subject to some detours by lower 
courts,28 for the fifty years between Conley and Twombly. The Supreme 
Court occasionally found it necessary to remind lower courts that the 
pleading rules could not be changed outside the rulemaking process,29 even 
as it acknowledged that heightened fact pleading might have “practical 
merits.”30 Twombly was the first sign of change, and I will highlight three 
significant aspects of the decision. First, the Court “retired” the language 
from Conley that tested a Rule 12(b)(6) motion by whether “the plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts”31 consistent with the defendant’s liability.32 Second, in 
 
23 See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 438-40 (1986) (reviewing the history of pleading standards in England 
and the United States prior to the promulgation of the Federal Rules). For an overall history of 
the Federal Rules, see generally Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987). 
24 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
25 Id. at 47. 
26 Id. at 45-46. 
27 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Summary Judgment, Pleading, and the Future of Transsubstantive 
Procedure, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1189, 1191-92 (2010) (discussing the historic role of Rule 12(b)(6)). 
28 Christopher Fairman, however, points to examples from many areas of law in which lower 
courts have constructed heightened pleading standards, arguing that notice pleading, at least in 
practice, has rarely been the rule. Fairman, supra note 22, at 998-1011. But this claim should not be 
overstated. See supra note 22 (citing cases demonstrating that, by the time Twombly was announced, 
most circuits had abandoned heightened pleading standards for particular types of cases). 
29 See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-13 (2002) (reversing the Second Circuit’s 
departure from notice pleading in employment discrimination cases); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. 
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (rejecting a heightened 
pleading standard for § 1983 claims against municipalities); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 
U.S. 574, 595 (1998) (cautioning courts that issues of pleading, discovery, and summary judgment 
should be resolved through rulemaking or legislation). 
30 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515. 
31 Conley, 355 U.S. at 45. 
32 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547, 563 (2007) (reviewing criticisms of 
Conley and concluding that expansive language of the case “has been questioned, criticized, and 
explained away long enough” and had therefore “earned its retirement”).  
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its place, Twombly substituted a “plausibility” inquiry,33 a term that was new 
to Rule 12 adjudications.34 Finally, the Twombly Court justified its new 
standard as necessary to protect defendants from the threat of burdensome 
discovery that extracts settlements even for claims of dubious merit.35 
“Careful case management” by district court judges had not worked, 
according to the Court, necessitating recourse to plausibility pleading 
standards.36 
Twombly was not the last word, however, because some observers and 
lower courts limited its reach to cases in which the costs of discovery were 
likely to be high and settlement-coercing.37 Iqbal resolved this short-lived 
dispute by making it clear that plausibility pleading applied to all civil cases, 
not just antitrust claims.38 Iqbal also articulated a two-step process for 
evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint.39 First, courts must review each 
allegation in a complaint and exclude from consideration those allegations 
stated in a “conclusory” fashion.40 Second, and consistent with Twombly, 
courts must conduct a plausibility analysis that assesses the fit between the 
nonconclusory facts alleged and the relief claimed.41 The judge may assess 
plausibility by calling on her “judicial experience and common sense,”42 a 
surprising turn from the judicial role contemplated in Conley.43 In sum, and 
most important for this Article, plausibility pleading depends on the judge 
to conduct a preliminary evaluation of the likelihood of a claim’s success.44 
 
33 Id. at 556-57. 
34 See Edward Brunet, The Substantive Origins of “Plausible Pleadings”: An Introduction to the 
Symposium on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 3-9 (reviewing the use of the word 
“plausible” in the summary judgment context). 
35 550 U.S. at 558-59. 
36 Id. at 559 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
37 See, e.g., Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488-89 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(suggesting that Twombly was “limited to expensive, complicated litigation” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
38 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (declaring that the “decision in Twombly expounded 
the pleading standard for all civil actions” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
39 Id. at 678-79. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 679. 
42 Id. 
43 See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957) (failing to provide any active role for the 
judge at the pleading stage). 
44 See, e.g., Hillel Y. Levin, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Lessons of the Celotex Trilogy, 14 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 143, 148 (2010) (describing plausibility pleading as an “explicit invitation for 
the judge to use his or her own experience and intuitions as a baseline for whether a complaint can 
proceed”); Marcia L. McCormick, Implausible Injuries: Wal-Mart v. Dukes and the Future of Class 
Actions and Employment Discrimination Cases, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 711, 721 (2013) (arguing that 
plausibility pleading “implicitly invites the judges to ask whether they believe the allegations”); 
Tung Yin, “I Do Not Think [Implausible] Means What You Think It Means”: Iqbal v. Ashcroft and 
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Plausibility pleading has taken the federal judicial world by storm. Iqbal 
already has been cited by approximately 70,000 reported opinions in less 
than five years, while Twombly has been cited 93,000 times over about six 
and a half years.45 The cases have also earned a fair share of academic 
attention. Many scholars have criticized Iqbal and Twombly for altering the 
meaning of the Federal Rules outside of the traditional procedures contem-
plated by the Rules Enabling Act.46 Others have lamented the vague and ill-
defined standard for its break from history and difficulty of application.47 
Scholars have even questioned the constitutionality of the plausibility 
analysis.48 Some academics, however, find at least a kernel of opportunity in 
the advent of plausibility pleading.49 Almost all commentators agree that 
Iqbal and Twombly break from the liberal pleading doctrine enunciated in 
1957 by Conley.50  
 
Judicial Vouching for Government Officials, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 203, 215-16 (2010) (arguing 
that the Supreme Court essentially performed “judicial vouching” in Iqbal by finding implausible 
the plaintiff ’s assertions that the defendants could have intentionally discriminated against Arabs 
and Muslims). 
45 These figures are those reported by Westlaw’s KeyCite feature on February 14, 2014. 
46 See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 27, at 1191 (“In Twombly and Iqbal, . . . the Court ignored 
the requirements of the Enabling Act and its own prior decisions on the difference between 
judicial interpretation and judicial amendment.”); Helen Hershkoff & Arthur R. Miller, Celebrating 
Jack H. Friedenthal: The Views of Two Co-authors, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 9, 28 (2009) (“Although 
Twombly did not alter the words of Rule 8(a)(2) itself, it substantially changed the provision’s 
understood meaning.”); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 84-89 (2010) (discussing how Twombly and Iqbal, as 
“legislative-like decisions,” work against the Supreme Court’s prior endorsements of the rulemaking 
process); Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV. 
LITIG. 313, 334 (2012) (“Critics of the new pleading regime have targeted [the Supreme Court’s] 
unexpected willingness to alter the pleading standard through adjudication rather than through 
rulemaking . . . .”). 
47 See Donald J. Kochan, While Effusive, “Conclusory” Is Still Quite Elusive: The Story of a Word, 
Iqbal, and a Perplexing Lexical Inquiry of Supreme Importance, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 215, 222-35 (2011) 
(discussing the history of usage of the word “conclusory”); see also Reinert, supra note 13, at 22-28 
(reviewing the Supreme Court’s use of the word “conclusory”). 
48 Two scholars have argued that plausibility pleading violates the Seventh Amendment. See 
generally Kenneth S. Klein, Is Ashcroft v. Iqbal the Death (Finally) of the “Historical Test” for 
Interpreting the Seventh Amendment?, 88 NEB. L. REV. 467 (2010); Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion 
to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851 (2008). 
49 Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 441, 466-68 
(2010) (arguing that plausibility pleading affords an opportunity to reconsider the Federal Rules’ 
trans-substantive approach); Mark Moller, Procedure’s Ambiguity, 86 IND. L.J. 645, 646-47 (2011) 
(maintaining that plausibility pleading allows courts “to adopt a blend of different, conflicting 
interpretations of a statute (or procedure)—yielding an average result that compromises . . . between 
competing preferences”). 
50 Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119, 121-25 & nn.11-24 
(2011). 
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In conclusion, as others have argued, plausibility pleading has injected 
instability into the spectrum of pleading.51 Plausibility pleading resembles 
other heightened pleading regimes in some respects, but only enough to sow 
confusion and doubt as to its application.52 Perhaps if one squints enough, 
the plausibility inquiry looks like summary judgment,53 but that provides 
little assistance at the pleading stage. It is not only the pleading standard’s 
content that has changed, but also the terms of the debate. Courts now 
expect the pleader to shoulder new and different burdens,54 and courts also 
impose new responsibilities on pleading itself. The next Part shows why 
plausibility pleading cannot realistically meet these expectations. 
 
II. (MIS)FITTING PLAUSIBILITY PLEADINGS INTO  
OUR CURRENT PROCEDURAL LANDSCAPE 
“Each aspect of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (or any state code of procedure) 
is part of a complex, highly interdependent system that collectively governs the liti-
gation process. Any alteration of one structure inevitably affects the functioning of 
the others, which, in turn, affects the entire process.”  
–Arthur R. Miller55 
Arthur Miller’s words capture the dynamic interplay among the multiple 
layers of our procedural system—an interplay that is particularly relevant to 
recent changes in pleading doctrine. Unfortunately, whether conceived of as 
an innovative or retrograde doctrine, plausibility pleading does not fit 
neatly in the existing procedural world. This argument, based on plausibility 
pleading’s compatibility with the wider procedural landscape, differs from 
the criticism that Iqbal and Twombly—like many decisions before them—
 
51 See Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 
IOWA L. REV. 821, 832 (2010) (“The new approach . . . clashes . . . with the prior procedural 
system [and] magnifies the destabilizing effect that comes from cutting a procedural system from 
its moorings.”). 
52 See, e.g., id. at 832-33 (discussing differences between plausibility pleading and historical 
“fact pleading”). For example, in some respects, the Twombly–Iqbal distinction between conclusory 
and factual allegations resembles the distinction courts make between conclusions of law and 
conclusions of fact, and between ultimate facts and evidential facts. See Charles E. Clark, The Code 
Cause of Action, 33 YALE L.J. 817, 832 (1924) (criticizing the idea of distinctions between these 
categories of allegations). 
53 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 11, at 28-34 (discussing the similarities and differences  
between Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss and summary judgment motions). 
54 See, e.g., Reinert, supra note 13, at 32-35 (discussing plausibility pleading as an “information-
forcing” regime). 
55 Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. 
L. REV. 427, 446 (1991).  
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continue to restrict access to the courthouse.56 This Part does not dispute 
the latter claim, but rather seeks to show an even more complicated problem. 
Our legal system, given earlier changes, cannot reliably sustain the burdens 
that plausibility pleading now imposes. 
Plausibility pleading requires judges to perform a novel and important 
task at the pleading stage: assess pleadings for their substantive merit, or 
their “plausibility.” For judges to apply the plausibility pleading standard 
effectively, they must have relevant judicial experience and reliable common 
sense upon which to rest their decisions. When one considers our “complex, 
highly interdependent” legal system,57 asking judges to rely on their “judicial 
experience and common sense”58 to assess plausibility is ill-advised, because 
federal judges have become increasingly removed from merits-based 
adjudication. Rather than rely on sound judicial experience, judges might 
rely on unreliable heuristics that take them further from accurate conclusions. 
Indeed, the dearth of judicial experience may partly explain why, as the 
available empirical data suggest, plausibility pleading has not effectively 
filtered cases on the basis of merit.59 
A. The Minimal Experience of Judges in Merits-Based Determinations 
1. The Vanishing Trial 
The first place one might look for judicial experience in assessing merit 
would be trial adjudication. Data show, however, that the number of trials in 
both state and federal courts has significantly declined over the past seventy-
five years.60 In 1938, nearly 20% of filed cases were tried,61 a percentage that 
 
56 See, e.g., Levin, supra note 44, at 145-48 (comparing plausibility pleading and the Rule 56 
summary judgment trilogy and showing that “the likely effect of both is to reduce access by 
plaintiffs to trial and juries”); Miller, supra note 14, at 346 (“[Under Twombly and Iqbal], even when 
a potential plaintiff ’s claims may have merit, cases may not be initiated because the risk of loss 
without any prospect of compensation . . . is too great.”). 
57 Miller, supra note 55, at 446. 
58 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 
59 See Reinert, supra note 50, at 161 (presenting data that show, inter alia, that “Iqbal and 
Twombly pose the potential to eliminate cases that have better than a 50% chance of being 
successful”). 
60 See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 464 fig.1 (2004) (showing that the 
number of civil trials across all U.S. district courts dropped from more than 12,000 in the 1980s to 
less than 5000 in 2002); Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial 
Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 705, 713 tbl.1 (2004) (presenting trial statistics from 1970 through 2000). But see 
Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 520-21 n.115 
(1986) (arguing that data regarding trial prevalence seventy-five years ago may be unreliable). 
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dropped to about 12% by the 1950s, and then to 1.7% by 2003.62 And although 
total dispositions increased five-fold between 1962 and 2000, the absolute 
number of trials decreased by one-fifth.63 Overall, the data indicate that our 
legal system no longer disposes of many more cases by trial than by summary 
judgment; much the opposite, it is now much more common to dispose of 
cases through summary judgment than through trial.64  
As a consequence, judges increasingly lack the experience of seeing a 
case through from its pleading stage to its ultimate resolution by a factfinder. 
The result of this decrease in trial experience manifests itself in the settlement 
context, and some commentators observe that settlement reflects the “strategic 
position of repeat players”65 more than calculations about the merits. 
Most important for this Article, having fewer trials leaves judges with 
less “judicial experience” in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of 
cases.66 Moreover, legal doctrine and arguments become increasingly removed 
from the facts, “[c]ontests of interpretation replace contests of proof,” and the 
law’s impact on primary conduct becomes more indeterminate.67 These 
trends limit the effectiveness of a judge attempting to apply a plausibility 
standard at the pleading stage. If a judge were to ask herself, “Does this 
claim resemble any I have seen in the past?” and “How did those claims 
turn out?,” she would have few answers on which to rely. 
2. The Rise of Private Adjudication 
Yet another trend limiting judicial experience in merits-based determinations 
is the growth of arbitration and alternative dispute resolution. Since at least 
the 1980s, the Supreme Court has found in the Federal Arbitration Act a 
national policy that favors arbitration agreements.68 There is little question 
 
61 Richard L. Steagall, The Recent Explosion in Summary Judgments Entered by the Federal Courts 
Has Eliminated the Jury from the Judicial Power, 33 S. ILL. U. L.J. 469, 469 (2009). 
62 Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 1255, 1258-59 (2005). 
63 See Galanter, supra note 60, at 461-64 & tbl.1, fig.1 (describing and presenting data from 
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts). 
64 See id. at 484 (“In 1975, the portion of disposition by trial (8.4 percent) was more than 
double the portion of summary judgments (3.7 percent), but in 2000 the summary judgment 
portion (7.7 percent) was more than three times as large as the portion of trials (2.2 percent).”). 
65 Id. at 526. 
66 See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class 
Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 566 (1991) (arguing that, in the securities class action context, 
judges lack the ability to foster substantively accurate settlements). 
67 Galanter, supra note 60, at 530. 
68 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748-49 (2011) (describing the 
primary goals of the Federal Arbitration Act and case law discussing the policy of the act); see also 
Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding: The Constitutional Implications of Arbitral Class Actions, 47 
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that arbitration has expanded in response.69 Predispute arbitration agree-
ments have evolved from being highly contested to being fully accepted by 
federal courts.70 The rise of private adjudication, in turn, has at least two 
consequences relevant here. First, it is one more means by which judges are 
removed from their traditional adjudicatory role. Second, because private 
dispute resolution is usually confidential, judges and the public are deprived 
of additional information about the nature and quality of particular areas of 
litigation. Both of these consequences matter for plausibility pleading 
because they affect the quality of judicial experience available for assessing 
the merits of a particular dispute. 
As the enforceability and scope of arbitration agreements have increased, 
arbitration has become ubiquitous across disparate areas of the law. One 
scholar estimated that between 15% and 25% of employers adopted arbitration 
agreements to resolve employment disputes in 2009.71 A more recent study 
found that mandatory arbitration clauses are present in almost 77% of 
consumer contracts and 93% of employment contracts.72 And the percentage 
of employees covered by such agreements is likely a fair bit higher than the 
percentage of employers who use them because larger employers are more 
likely to adopt mandatory arbitration agreements.73 
The goal of arbitration, of course, is to reduce costs and risks associated 
with litigation.74 Merchants may view arbitration as cheaper, faster, and less 
 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1711, 1715 (2006) (recognizing the “national policy favoring arbitration” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
69 See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the 
Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 408-12 (2007) (reviewing empirical studies 
of employment arbitration); Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. 
Approach to Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to That of the Rest of the World, 56 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 831, 834 (2002) (“Together, these major decisions have inspired numerous 
companies to require their customers and employees to arbitrate rather than litigate future 
disputes.”). 
70 See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 9-11 
(reviewing the expansion of arbitration in the twentieth century). 
71 Colvin, supra note 69, at 411. 
72 Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration 
Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 880, 882-84 
(2008) (reporting on a survey of consumer contracts for companies with “significant market shares 
or name recognition in the telecommunications, credit, and financial services industries” and 
results from an employment contract database). 
73 Colvin, supra note 69, at 410. 
74 See John-Paul Alexandrowicz, A Comparative Analysis of the Law Regulating Employment 
Arbitration Agreements in the United States and Canada, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 1007, 1009-11 
(2002) (suggesting that corporate employers embrace arbitration because they distrust the legal 
system and fear large jury awards); Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player 
Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 204 (1997) (citing a study finding that 75% of employers 
surveyed adopted arbitration plans to reduce litigation costs); Colvin, supra note 69, at 411-12 
 
  
1778 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 162: 1767 
 
transparent than litigation.75 Courts, too, seem to have embraced arbitration 
agreements in part because they reduce litigation.76 Indeed, one key narrative 
on the Supreme Court’s road to arbitration is that arbitration is no better or 
worse than judicial resolution of competing claims.77 
Whatever one’s view of the relative value of procedures for adjudication 
in public courts, the private nature of arbitration and its ken make plausibility 
pleading yet more difficult to apply. Most important, arbitrators generally 
do not publish or explain their decisions, essentially leaving everyone but 
the parties in the dark about the facts of the dispute and the reasons for how 
the dispute was resolved.78 Indeed, it is the confidentiality of arbitration 
that makes it so appealing to many parties.79 This secrecy has earned its 
critics, who recognize that one of arbitration’s costs is the loss of information 
that one can obtain from public trials and proceedings—information which 
permits litigants to better evaluate the law and make critical decisions.80 But 
critics have not focused on the negative effect that increased private dispute 
resolution has on judicial experience—experience critical for judges who 
now have to assess a claim’s plausibility early in the life cycle of a case. 
3. Secret Settlements 
Along with private adjudication, the principal reason most cases do not 
proceed to trial is that they are settled.81 And settlements can bear on a 
 
(summarizing data suggesting that past experiences with litigation were the primary driver for 
employers who adopted employment arbitration). 
75 Sternlight, supra note 69, at 832. 
76 Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for 
Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 661 (1996) (suggesting that, in encouraging arbitration, 
the Supreme Court was “at least influenced by a desire to conserve judicial resources”). 
77 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 
(1985) (“By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights 
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, 
forum.”). 
78 See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory 
Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449, 455-56 (1996) 
(comparing arbitration to adjudication). 
79 Id. at 456. 
80 See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial Institu-
tions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267, 322-27 (1995) 
(questioning the use of arbitrators to resolve public law disputes because confidentiality under-
mines enforcement efforts); see also Sternlight, supra note 69, at 839 (discussing the failure of 
arbitration to educate the public about claims and defenses that arise in public law litigation, such 
as those involving consumer safety, employment discrimination, and abuses by financial institutions). 
81 See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to Trial?: An Empirical Study of Predictors of 
Failure to Settle, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315, 319-21 (1999) (explaining, from an economic 
perspective, why the vast majority of cases settle). 
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judge’s assessment of plausibility. After all, if settlements enable a putative 
plaintiff to better evaluate the connection between a defendant’s conduct 
and the plaintiff ’s injury,82 they would be of similar benefit to judges 
assessing the plausibility of that claim and other similar claims.83 But 
confidential settlements have become the norm in most private law cases, 
further depriving courts of potentially relevant information.84 
Secret settlements have been criticized on multiple grounds. First, they 
interfere with the ability of lawyers and judges to accurately assess the 
merits of any particular settlement85 and with the public’s ability to accurately 
monitor health and safety issues.86 Moreover, secret settlements erode a 
court’s ability to reliably understand background states of affairs because 
 
82 See Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Informational Externalities in Settlement 
Bargaining: Confidentiality and Correlated Culpability, 33 RAND J. ECON. 587, 592 (2002) (“The 
disposition of P1’s suit is likely to affect the probability that P2 makes the connection between her 
injury and D’s activity.”).  
83 Cf. Andrew D. Goldstein, Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the Rules Governing Public Access 
to Information Generated Through Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 375, 402-03 (2006) (arguing 
that publicly available discovery has the potential to verify allegations of wrongdoing). 
84 See Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 927, 
945-46 (2006) (observing that often, the only document filed with the court is a joint stipulation 
of dismissal on grounds of settlement); Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic 
Analysis of Confidential Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 869 (2007) (noting that public 
settlements are the exception); Robert Timothy Reagan, The Hunt for Sealed Settlement Agreements, 
81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 439, 459 (2006) (noting that it is common for settlement agreements to 
be confidential, even if a formal request to seal settlement documents is not made in most cases). 
85 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 66, at 567 (noting that “in a world where all cases settle, it 
may not even be possible to base settlements on the merits because lawyers may not be able to 
make reliable estimates of expected trial outcomes”); Moss, supra note 84, at 898 (“When more 
settlements are public, other attorneys and parties can make better estimates of the settlement 
values of their own claims, because they can see the settlement amounts—the ‘pL’ estimates—in 
prior similar cases.”); Rhonda Wasserman, Secret Class Action Settlements, 31 REV. LITIG. 889, 920 
(2012) (“If settlements are routinely filed under seal, courts will lack the comparative data needed 
to gauge the fairness of settlements submitted for their approval.”); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical 
Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469, 517 (1994) (discussing the utility of 
settlements for case valuation in the mass tort context). 
86 See generally Laurie Kratky Doré, Settlement, Secrecy, and Judicial Discretion: South Carolina’s 
New Rules Governing the Sealing of Settlements, 55 S.C. L. REV. 791, 792 (2004) (citing the Firestone 
litigation as an example of the negative impact of confidential orders, given that recalls and federal 
investigation of defect tires were not initiated until eight years after the first product liability 
suits); Christopher R. Drahozal & Laura J. Hines, Secret Settlement Restrictions and Unintended 
Consequences, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1457, 1458 (2006) (providing examples of secret settlements of 
cases involving public health hazards, including automobiles, vaccines, painkillers, heart valves, 
toxic leak sites, asbestos, tobacco, and breast implants, among others); Goldstein, supra note 83, at 
401-03 (noting that, unlike many European countries, the United States relies on civil litigation to 
reveal information of public interest); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 
83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2650 (1995) (discussing public controversy about secret settlements concealing 
health and safety matters in the 1980s); Moss, supra note 84, at 906-08 (explaining how secret 
settlements render consumers unable to distinguish between safe and unsafe products). 
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courts themselves cannot investigate and present facts.87 For a court required 
to assess the “plausibility” of a particular claim, ignorance about the sub-
stantive content of settlements of similar claims will be another barrier to 
accuracy. 
4. Access to Discovery 
Protective orders preventing disclosure of information learned during 
discovery have also become routine.88 They have proliferated largely because 
the actors in any given case—the litigants and the judge—often have 
converging interests in maintaining secrecy.89 To the extent that the propriety 
of protective orders has been debated, discussion has focused on informational 
costs to the public and other litigants. Critics of protective orders maintain 
that both the public and other litigants have valid interests in obtaining 
discovery in pending lawsuits,90 while proponents argue that litigation is not 
 
87 Owen Fiss spoke more broadly to some of these concerns in the context of settlement 
itself, predicting that, for example, a judge called upon to modify a consent decree will lack 
competence precisely because “[h]e has no basis for assessing the request.” Owen M. Fiss, Against 
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1083-85 (1984). 
88 See Laurie Kratky Doré, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the Pursuit of 
Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 285 (1999) (“Consensual secrecy pervades virtually 
every phase of modern civil litigation.”); Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order 
Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 11 (1983) (noting that “parties are often overzealous” in making 
confidentiality designations). 
89 See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1122 n.18 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that 
courts sign off on blanket protective orders because “the time that it would take a judicial officer to 
rule on the protectability of thousands of documents could cripple the court,” and because the 
document-by-document approach would be unduly expensive for the parties); William G. Childs, 
When the Bell Can’t Be Unrung: Document Leaks and Protective Orders in Mass Tort Litigation, 27 REV. 
LITIG. 565, 566 (2008) (explaining that parties to mass tort litigation often agree to protective 
orders because they are “a practical way to deal with the sheer volume of exhibits,” they respect 
some documents’ legitimate need for secrecy, and they provide additional settlement leverage for 
plaintiffs); Goldstein, supra note 83, at 415-16 (arguing that “[t]he routine granting of umbrella 
protective orders . . . benefits defendants and judges at the expense of the public”); Marcus, 
supra note 88, at 9 (describing antitrust defendants’ motivation to keep documents confidential to 
prevent disclosure to codefendant competitors that might itself be used in later antitrust litigation 
as evidence of price-fixing); Jack B. Weinstein, Secrecy in Civil Trials: Some Tentative Views, 9 J.L. 
& POL’Y 53, 57-58 (2000) (“Defendants want to avoid disclosure of damaging information. 
Plaintiffs desire to use this damaging information as a negotiation tool for larger settlements for 
clients in the future.”). 
90 See Doré, supra note 88, at 306-07 (summarizing the views of “public access advocates”); 
Jack H. Friedenthal, Secrecy in Civil Litigation: Discovery and Party Agreements, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 67, 
92 (2000) (focusing on how sharing discovery among cases based upon closely related situations 
saves time and costs); Goldstein, supra note 83, at 375-79 (arguing that protective orders threaten 
public health and safety interests); Luban, supra note 86, at 2653 (noting that public access to 
discovery information “might save lives” and “inform[] public deliberation about an issue of 
substantial political significance”); Alan B. Morrison, Essay, Protective Orders, Plaintiffs, Defendants 
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a venue for generating information to be shared collectively.91 This emphasis 
on the public’s access to information, while important, unfortunately 
obscures the importance of judicial access to information. To the extent that 
judicial interests have been considered at all in this debate, the focus has 
been on how protective orders aid judges by conserving their scarce resources 
and time.92 Lost in the commentary, however, is any recognition that 
providing greater informational access to judges will improve the quality of 
their decisionmaking—particularly when judges must consider alternative 
explanations for the misconduct alleged by plaintiffs in light of their 
“judicial experience and common sense.”93 
Drawing upon an example from litigation against General Motors, one 
can imagine how the confidentiality of discovery materials can interact with 
judicial assessments of plausibility. In 1992, General Motors settled a 
lawsuit with the family of a man who had died in his GM pickup truck, 
which caught fire after a side-impact collision with another vehicle.94 The 
amount of the settlement and all documents exchanged during discovery 
were treated as confidential by the parties.95 Indeed, as a condition of the 
settlement, the family was made to return to General Motors all documents 
provided by the company.96 After suit was brought pursuant to a Texas Rule 
of Civil Procedure permitting courts to make public certain discovery 
information when it relates to disclosures that “have a probable adverse 
effect upon the general public health or safety,”97 General Motors ultimately 
released the documents.98 Apparently, the company had known since 1974 
that its fuel tank design posed a “greater fire hazard than other fuel tank 
 
and the Public Interest in Disclosure; Where Does the Balance Lie?, 24 U. RICH. L. REV. 109, 115-16 
(1989) (arguing that disallowing sharing of information among plaintiffs’ attorneys maximizes 
inefficiency); Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, 
Compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 587, 662-63 
(2005) (noting that protective orders may interfere with disclosure of information to regulatory 
bodies such as the FDA). 
91 See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 
457, 472 (treating courts as best situated for information management, not information production 
or consumption); Miller, supra note 55, at 467 (arguing against the presumption that all litigation 
is important to the public).  
92 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 55, at 488-89 (opining that asking courts to analyze and disseminate 
discovery information “would distract judges from their primary mission”). 
93 Andrew Goldstein has discussed the role of confidentiality in preventing the public from 
monitoring judicial behavior or seeking education about courts’ everyday activities, but not how 
access to information assists judges themselves. Goldstein, supra note 83, at 381-82. 
94 Id. at 419. 
95 Id. 
96 Id.  
97 TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(2)(c). 
98 Goldstein, supra note 83, at 420.  
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configurations, but had not changed the design until 1988.”99 Now, consider 
a judge, prior to the release of the General Motors records, evaluating a 
complaint alleging that General Motors “knew” that the placement of fuel 
tanks on its pickup trucks was unnecessarily dangerous. A judge who was 
aware of the documents unsealed after the 1992 settlement would surely 
evaluate plausibility differently from a judge who was ignorant of those 
documents. 
In fact, judges sometimes do use this kind of information to assess com-
plaints under a plausibility regime. Judge Nancy Gertner, for instance, took 
notice of the public attention devoted to sexual abuse in prisons to find that 
a complaint raised a plausible inference of deliberate indifference.100 Judge 
Jack Weinstein surveyed his colleagues on the bench and concluded that 
New York City police officers, as a general matter, engaged in “repeated, 
widespread falsification,” and, therefore, that a constitutional claim against 
New York City was plausible.101 Where such information from prior cases is 
unavailable, however, courts have relied on their own suppositions and 
assumptions to find a claim implausible. In the Southern District of New 
York, for example, a court dismissed a § 1983 claim against the City of New 
York that alleged that an officer’s actions in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment were pursuant to an unwritten City policy, instead finding it 
more plausible that the officer who carried out the search “was a rogue 
officer who disobeyed City policy.”102 Similarly, in a suit against a Tennessee 
county under a “class of one” theory of equal protection, the Court found an 
“obvious alternative explanation” for the differential treatment of plaintiffs 
was that the defendants “made a mistake in applying the law”—not that 
they singled out plaintiffs for pernicious reasons.103 Thus, to the extent that 
 
99 Id. 
100 See Chao v. Ballista, 630 F. Supp. 2d 170, 178 (D. Mass. 2009) (“Given the public attention 
devoted to sexual abuse in prisons writ large, . . . it is a fair inference from the pleadings that 
prison officials . . . were deliberately indifferent to the risks and reality of this abuse.”). 
101 See Colon v. City of New York, No. 09-0008, 2009 WL 4263362, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 
2009) (noting that “[i]nformal inquiry by the court and among the judges of this court . . . has 
revealed anecdotal evidence of repeated, widespread falsification by arresting police officers of the 
New York City Police Department”). 
102 5 Borough Pawn, LLC v. City of New York, 640 F. Supp. 2d 268, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
103 Arnold v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., No. 09-0163, 2009 WL 2430822, 
at *4-5 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 6, 2009) (“When confronted with nothing more than bare assertions of 
unlawful activity, a court’s first instinct is not to conclude that a violation occurred when it could 
‘just as well be’ explained as innocent conduct.”). For another example of a court making a 
plausibility determination based on personal assumptions, see Chassen v. Fid. Nat’l Fin., Inc., No. 
09-291, 2009 WL 4508581, at *10 (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 2009), which found conclusory the allegation that 
defendants were part of a RICO enterprise, a conclusion drawn in part from the court’s “common 
experience.” 
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the trend toward keeping discovery confidential continues, judges will have 
even less basis for assessing the merits of a particular claim at the pleading stage. 
5. A Potential Counter-Narrative: Summary Judgment 
Even though judicial trial experience is limited, one might think that 
judicial experience with the merits-based determination at summary 
judgment is a sufficient substitute. After all, summary judgment is the 
procedural landmark that looms largest after the pleading stage. Moreover, 
the availability of summary judgment—if not its frequency—has increased 
since the Rule 56 trilogy of 1986.104 Given the decline of the jury trial and 
the rise of settlement, summary judgment has, for many lawsuits, become 
the final point of judicial intervention.105 
Yet there are several reasons to doubt the notion that experience adjudi-
cating summary judgment motions provides judges with ample grounds for 
assessing a claim’s plausibility at the pleading stage. First, cases that reach 
the summary judgment stage are not necessarily representative of the 
distribution of strong and weak cases throughout the federal docket. Due to 
the prevalence of settlement, both strong and weak cases are likely removed 
from the pool of cases adjudicated on the merits.106 Second, because the 
summary judgment decision is made before the judge has the most and 
highest-quality information, there is a real risk of error.107 This error may be 
 
104 See Mark W. Bennett, Essay, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary Judgment” 
Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment Affirmed Without 
Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 685, 688-89 (2012–
2013) (discussing the increased use of summary judgment to resolve cases over several decades of 
employment discrimination jurisprudence); Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: 
Reconsidering Summary Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
81, 87 (2006) (relying on empirical evidence that “[f]ederal courts cite Matsushita, Anderson, and 
Celotex more than any decisions ever issued by a federal tribunal”). 
105 See Bennett, supra note 104, at 691-92 (noting that the trilogy has made summary judg-
ment, not jury trials, the “Holy Grail” of litigation (quoting Mark W. Bennett, Judges’ Views on 
Vanishing Civil Trials, 88 JUDICATURE 306, 307 (2005))); Edward Brunet, Essay, The Efficiency of 
Summary Judgment, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 689, 697-99 (2012) (arguing that summary judgment 
determinations can prompt a settlement); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the 
“Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial 
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1016 (2003) (declaring summary judgment the “focal point” 
of modern litigation). 
106 See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6-30 (1984) (presenting a model for determining whether the parties will settle 
or continue litigating a dispute). 
107 See Richard L. Marcus, Completing Equity’s Conquest? Reflections on the Future of Trial Under 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 725, 739-42, 755-74 (1989) (discussing the 
trend away from jury trials to summary judgment proceedings and the resulting accuracy 
concerns); Miller, supra note 105, at 1042 (noting that some plaintiffs with likely meritorious claims 
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amplified by the 1986 trilogy, which had the effect of skewing summary 
judgment in a pro-defendant direction.108 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 
Ltd., v. Zenith Radio Corp.,109 like Iqbal and Twombly, gave judges the power 
to engage in docket reduction by deeming certain allegations “implausible” 
based on the judge’s perspective on human motivation.110 Celotex permitted 
defendants to move for summary judgment without providing any affirmative 
evidence at all.111 And, for certain cases, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,112 
heightened the burden on plaintiffs resisting summary judgment.113 Finally, 
there are also reasons to question the ability of judges to resolve summary 
judgment motions without applying subjective standards of believability 
according to their own inaccessible, irrefutable, and arguably unrepresenta-
tive cultural norms.114 
Plausibility pleading presents even more troubling risks of error and bias 
than summary judgment. After all, the summary judgment standard is at 
least well understood in theory, even if its application is contested. Sum-
mary judgment resolutions are also more transparent; they are based on 
public evidence that has already passed the Rubicon of admissibility. The 
public can therefore evaluate summary judgment decisions by an external 
standard—what a reasonable person could find true given the available 
 
cannot afford to assemble a prima facie case prior to trial); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: 
The Supreme Court’s Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication 
Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 171-81 (1988) (identifying the limitations of summary judgment and 
arguing that the increased use of summary judgment will ultimately generate less accurate 
adjudication). 
108 Stempel, supra note 107, at 181 (“[T]he ‘new’ summary judgment shifts the system’s results 
in favor of defendants and against claimants as well as permits this shift to occur upon a less rich 
data base.”). 
109 475 U.S. 574 (1986).  
110 Stempel, supra note 107, at 102 (stating that, to the Matsushita majority, the plaintiffs’ 
theory of the case failed, because the actions attributed to the defendants “were not the practices 
of prudent businesspeople and therefore almost certainly could not have occurred”). 
111 See id. at 105-06 (noting that the Celotex majority only required the defendant moving for 
summary judgment to point out in the record the lack of any evidence to support the plaintiff ’s 
contentions). 
112 477 U.S. 242 (1986).  
113 See id. at 103-05 (explaining that the Anderson Court required that “a movant’s evidence 
opposing a properly made summary judgment motion must be more than merely possible or 
colorable,” but rather “must be of sufficient probative value to withstand a directed verdict motion 
and support the verdict of a reasonable jury”).  
114 Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of 
Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 881-87 (2009) (discussing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 
372 (2007), and finding, after surveying people who viewed the Scott videotape, that the Court’s 
“view of the facts . . . divide[d] citizens on social, cultural, and political lines”). 
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evidence.115 The bases for plausibility determinations, by contrast, are 
opaque at best and invisible at worst. Studying the reliability of plausibility 
assessments by federal judges presents several obstacles. For instance, it is 
not clear what would constitute a proper comparison population.116 As a 
result, it is more difficult to evaluate the extent to which judicial assessments 
of plausibility are culturally bound than it is to make similar evaluations in 
the summary judgment context.  
The end result of all of these trends is a federal judiciary that has very 
little experience evaluating the merits of claims. Trials have decreased and 
cases have been shunted away from federal court by arbitration doctrine. 
Information that might assist in assessing plausibility, such as discovery and 
settlement information, is increasingly inaccessible. And summary judgment 
adjudication cannot make up for this lack of information and experience.  
Overall, it is fair to say that we have transitioned from a 1938 litigation 
practice that encouraged adjudications on the merits to a contemporary 
practice that seeks to dispose of cases as efficiently as possible.117 When we 
move away from public adjudication, we lose something important: infor-
mation about how our justice system works to resolve disputes.118 This 
information, and the process by which it is divulged, is important not only 
for its own sake but also for reinforcing a democratic norm of equal  
accountability.119 What is sometimes overlooked, however, is that the infor-
mation is important to ensuring legitimate and reliable future adjudication. 
Instead of allowing judges to gain experience in adjudicating cases, we have 
turned them into “efficiency experts trying to curtail run-away cases and 
provoke settlements, largely on an ad hoc basis.”120 The drafters of the 
Federal Rules have been accused of having had unrealistically high expecta-
 
115 Cf. id. at 886-87 (criticizing the result in Scott because it disagreed with assessments of the 
evidence by certain marginalized groups). 
116 Plausibility pleading is not meant to substitute for jury assessments. Rather, it appears to 
contemplate subjective differences from judge to judge. It is not clear what standard one would use 
to instruct a comparison population, nor is it clear what evidence the study population would 
evaluate. 
117 See Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The Revolution of 1938 and Its Discontents, 
61 OKLA. L. REV. 275, 286, 291 (2008) (contrasting the 1938 objective to resolve cases through a 
fair trial with the current trend of “resolving formally filed litigation short of actual trial”). 
118 Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal Courts, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
579, 669 (2010) (describing the benefits of public trials). 
119 See id. at 667 (“Lawsuits in democratic regimes oblige even the government to disgorge 
information and hence to be subjected to scrutiny.”). 
120 Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a Sound Procedural 
System: The Case for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79, 101 (1997). 
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tions of federal judges’ abilities to manage their dockets.121 The advocates of 
plausibility pleading, however, appear to have placed even higher expectations 
on the judiciary, without accounting for the more significant barriers posed 
by the dynamics of our current procedural regime. 
B. Plausibility Pleading and Cognitive Bias 
The expectations associated with plausibility pleading are unrealistic not 
only because of the changing content of judges’ daily work, as discussed 
above, but also because of how judges apply their prior experience to new 
cases. When judges attempt to evaluate the merits of a claim, cognitive 
biases may taint their assessment precisely because the judges’ prior experience 
with actual merits-based determinations is so thin.122 Cognitive biases are, 
of course, only biases. They can be overcome, they do not operate in 
isolation, and they are not uniform. Yet they cannot be ignored. And 
although cognitive biases may have an impact on many kinds of judicial 
decisionmaking, several well-studied biases seem particularly relevant to the 
plausibility pleading standard. 
One cognitive bias that may play a role in judicial merits assessments 
relates to the well-known importance of first impressions: belief persever-
ance.123 After forming an initial belief, “we tend to disregard evidence that 
contradicts that hypothesis and exaggerate evidence that confirms it.”124 
This is particularly problematic if one’s basis for drawing the initial conclu-
sion is insubstantial, because it will be a challenge to “interpret correctly 
subsequent better information that is inconsistent with that hypothesis.”125 
Combined with confirmatory bias—the tendency to interpret ambiguous 
information as supportive of one’s initial hypothesis, particularly when that 
information is complex—belief perseverance makes clear the importance of 
initial hypotheses.126 Thus, if a judge starts (or arrives after experience) at 
 
121 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Halting Devolution or Bleak to the Future: Subrin’s New–Old Procedure 
as a Possible Antidote to Dreyfuss’s “Tolstoy Problem,” 46 FLA. L. REV. 57, 82 (1994) (“The original 
rulemakers overestimated judges’ ability to efficiently control discovery, to shape litigation in the 
face of notice pleading, to appreciate the fine distinctions between a weak case and one deserving 
summary disposition, and to control errant lawyers and juries.”). 
122 Jeffrey W. Stempel, In Praise of Procedurally Centered Judicial Disqualification—and a Stronger 
Conception of the Appearance Standard: Better Acknowledging and Adjusting to Cognitive Bias, Spoliation, 
and Perceptual Realities, 30 REV. LITIG. 733, 740-49 (2011). 
123 For a brief explanation of this phenomenon, see Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, 
Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 646-47 
(1999). 
124 Id. at 646. 
125 Id. at 647. 
126 See id. at 647-48. 
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the belief that a certain category of cases is overrepresented with high- or 
low-merit claims, it will likely affect the judge’s assessment of the plausibility 
of the next similar claim. And this belief may persist even when faced with 
new and better information to the contrary. 
Moreover, to the extent that caution is desirable in making certain plau-
sibility determinations, some judges will exhibit overconfidence bias that 
hinders their ability to make such determinations, especially when the 
standard being applied explicitly permits them to base their decision on 
their “judicial experience and common sense.” Judges, like most people, 
overestimate their abilities and underestimate their own biases.127 Judges 
also often falsely believe that others see the world in the same way that they 
do.128 Finally, the representativeness heuristic “prompts people to complete 
an indeterminate picture in accord with preconceived patterns of thought, 
experience, or association,” a particular problem when judges have so little 
information to call upon to determine the plausibility of a particular 
claim.129 
Similar caution is in order when courts must assess the probabilities  
associated with a certain claim at the pleading stage, an inquiry that the 
Iqbal Court contemplated (and engaged in). When assessing probabilities, 
people often begin by setting an arbitrary baseline estimate “for which they 
make insufficient adjustments.”130 That baseline is influenced by evidence 
that is “particularly salient, vivid, or easily ‘available’” to the decisionmaker, 
even if that evidence is not empirically rigorous.131 And even when a judge 
has access to reliable and relevant statistical data, she may still substitute 
unrepresentative conclusions drawn from past events that are easily called to 
memory.132 Relatedly, we tend to overrate the representativeness of the 
small sample consisting of our own experience.133 The result for probabilistic 
assessments is significant: mental shortcuts can easily result in an estimate 
 
127 Stempel, supra note 122, at 743-44 (elaborating on this “self-serving or egocentric bias”). 
128 See id. at 744-46 (describing a “false consensus bias” operating in conjunction with other 
heuristics). 
129 Id. at 747. 
130 Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 5 (Cass R. 
Sunstein ed., 2000). 
131 See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 123, at 662 (discussing the “availability heuristic” bias that 
affects probability perceptions). 
132 Id. at 663-64 (providing, as an example, evidence that people tend to assess a city’s crime 
rate by whether they personally know someone who has been victimized there, rather than by 
crime statistics). 
133 Id. at 665 (reviewing evidence from study of experienced research psychologists who 
“honored the fallacious law of small numbers”). 
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that has “little or no relationship to actual probabilities,” and the decisionmaker 
will be far too optimistic about the reliability of this estimate.134 
The presence of these heuristics has led some scholars to call for restraint 
when judges resolve motions for summary judgment.135 One can easily see 
how these biases could also undermine the accuracy of plausibility pleading 
determinations. A judge seeking to assess the “plausibility” of a claim for 
relief may be tempted to call upon her store of experience with similar 
cases. But, as I argue above, that experience is seriously limited and likely 
unrepresentative. After all, the vast majority of past similar cases settled, 
and the judge was likely unaware of the settlement amount, let alone the 
facts that motivated the settlement. Actual merits-based assessments—trials 
and motions for summary judgment—are also of limited utility for the 
reasons explained above. 
Finally, the atmospherics of plausibility pleading—the consequences of 
pleadings surviving motions to dismiss—may function to reduce the 
reliability of judicial assessments of merit. Costs and benefits posed by risks 
are generally not assessed independently of each other. In other words, if a 
particular risk “is perceived as posing high costs, it tends also to be perceived 
as posing low benefits.”136 So if a judge assessing plausibility perceives 
allowing discovery as a risk that imposes a high cost (namely, the possibility 
of coercing the defendant to settle), that judge is likely to view the benefits 
of opening that door to be lower than they are in actuality. If, by contrast, 
the judge focuses on the risk of eliminating a meritorious claim, her assessment 
of the benefit of permitting the claim to go forward will relate to how she 
values the claim in the first place. 
The heuristics discussed above could impact the assessment of any kind 
of claim. But some implicit biases that track explicit racial, gender, or ethnic 
prejudice137 may specifically affect plausibility analysis for particular kinds 
of claims. For example, in determining employment discrimination claims, 
the role of implicit racial bias can be quite prominent. This is particularly 
problematic because the plaintiff will rarely have direct evidence of discrim-
 
134 Id. at 667. 
135 See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Taking Cognitive Illiberalism Seriously: Judicial Humility, Aggregate 
Efficiency, and Acceptable Justice, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 627, 636 (2012) (asserting that “judges 
should be reluctant to grant summary judgment unless there is essentially no serious prospect that 
others will disagree” about what the facts of the case show). 
136 Hanson & Kysar, supra note 123, at 671. 
137 See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1128-32 (2012) 
(reviewing empirical data supporting findings of prejudicial attitudes in cognitive biases). 
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ination.138 A judge’s assessment of plausibility is therefore susceptible to 
influence by his implicit biases related to discrimination and its prevalence 
in the workplace.139 And because many judges believe themselves to be more 
objective than their average colleague (a mathematical impossibility), judges 
are particularly vulnerable to such biases.140 
CONCLUSION 
“The history of procedure is a series of attempts to solve the problems created by the 
preceding generation’s procedural reforms.” 
–Judith Resnik141 
“I fear that every age must learn its lesson that special pleading cannot be made to 
do the service of trial and that live issues between active litigants are not to be 
disposed of or evaded on the paper pleadings . . . . I have spent a lifetime studying, 
teaching, and working in this field and I assert dogmatically that strict special 
pleading has never been found workable or even useful in English and American 
law.” 
–Hon. Charles E. Clark142 
Both Professor Resnik and Judge Clark are right when it comes to plausibility 
pleading. At the Federal Rules’ fiftieth-anniversary conference, Paul  
Carrington predicted that pressure to make novel use of Rule 12 could come 
from impatience with summary judgment’s “ineffectiveness as a tool for 
dealing with unfounded contentions”—pressure that did not abate with the 
announcement of the 1986 trilogy.143 Ultimately the pressure for change 
came—as it almost always has—from the perceived high costs of discovery. 
When the Supreme Court turned toward plausibility pleading in Twombly, 
its justification was rooted in the fear that defendants would be coerced into 
 
138 Id. at 1153-56 (summarizing studies showing that implicit bias affects employer decision-
making). 
139 See Trina Jones, Anti-Discrimination Law in Peril?, 75 MO. L. REV. 423, 433-34 (2010) 
(arguing that employment discrimination claims have to overcome the judicial assumption that 
“discrimination is rare and aberrant”); see also Kang et al., supra note 137, at 1159-64 (pointing to 
research suggesting that judges ruling on motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment 
likely rule on only enough facts to generate or implicate social biases). 
140 See Kang et al., supra note 137, at 1172-73 (highlighting research showing that judges think 
highly of their own objectivity); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial 
Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1225 (2009) (“[ J]udges might be overconfident about 
their abilities to control their own biases.”). 
141 Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 624 (1985). 
142 Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in the “Big Case,” 21 F.R.D. 45, 46-47 (1957). 
143 Carrington, supra note 6, at 2106. 
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settling meritless claims to avoid substantial discovery costs.144 Responding 
to the dissent’s claim that the majority’s fear of discovery was overblown 
and could be mitigated by careful judicial management, the Court responded 
that the “hope of effective judicial supervision is slim” under the current 
system.145 The source of the Court’s pessimism was a 1989 article by Judge 
Easterbrook, from which it quoted extensively.146 Easterbrook emphasized 
that courts are ill-equipped to supervise discovery competently because 
pleadings generally lack detail: “We cannot prevent what we cannot detect; 
we cannot detect what we cannot define; we cannot define ‘abusive’ discovery 
except in theory, because in practice we lack essential information.”147 
 It is worth taking a moment to consider the logic of the Twombly 
Court’s argument. At its heart, it seems to be saying that because judges 
cannot and do not know enough to supervise discovery, we will instead ask 
judges to do more with even less information at the pleading stage. Moreover, 
the consequences of judges’ decisions at that stage will be even more severe. 
Granting a motion to dismiss will end the plaintiff ’s case; denying the 
motion will leave the defendant exposed to the same “in terrorem” fear of 
costly discovery that concerned the Court in Twombly.148 No matter how one 
approaches the problem, however, for plausibility pleading to work, judges 
must be well-positioned to apply it. I have tried to argue here that, whether 
one accepts the Twombly Court’s pessimism about the “hope of effective 
judicial supervision” in a notice pleading regime, there is reason to be just as 
pessimistic about the prospect of accurate judicial application of plausibility 
pleading, “[g]iven the system that we have.”149  
At the same time, plausibility pleading may meet the perceived needs of 
the current generation in the same way that notice pleading met the needs 
of the 1938 generation.150 For instance, one can trace the motivation to 
implement notice pleading to the perception that ordinary businesspeople 
would otherwise lose faith in traditional adjudication, filled with potholes 
that could sink a meritorious claim on the basis of hypertechnical and 
 
144 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (discussing the “enormous expense” 
of discovery). 
145 Id. at 560 n.6. 
146 Id. (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Comment, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 
638-39 (1989)). 
147  Frank H. Easterbrook, Comment, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638-39 
(1989). 
148 550 U.S. at 546.  
149 Id. at 560 n.6.  
150 See Resnik, supra note 60, at 540-42 (comparing the adjudicatory concerns of past generations 
with current procedural needs). 
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confusing common law rules.151 If Thomas Shelton, who, in 1922, viewed the 
then-proposed Federal Rules as a means to reduce political dissent, thought 
that arcane rules were “making Bolshevists” by dismissing claims on a “techni-
cality,”152 today’s reformers see defendants losing faith in the legal system 
due to burdensome discovery imposed by a plaintiff “armed” against 
defendants “with nothing more than conclusions.”153 The 1938 rulemakers 
worried that the merits were obscured by hypertechnical rules;154 the 
current Court worries that discovery costs, not ultimate merit, drive 
everything. And while the drafters of the 1938 Rules believed in procedure, 
even as they distrusted a focus on “ultimate truth,”155 today’s Court may 
instead have less faith in procedure and more faith in judicial attempts to 
discover ultimate truth.156 One can only hope that the next twenty-five 
years, much like the last, will provide opportunities to assess the wisdom of 
this faith and, if necessary, the courage to change course. 
 
 
151 See Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, 
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